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Principal-Agent Relation in Conserving the Kali Putih 
Area in the Reconstruction and Mitigation Zone of 
Merapi Mountain National Park
Abstract
This article aims to observe the  dynamics of policy implementation involving 
various stakeholders in the effort of conserving one of the National Parks 
in Indonesia, particularly Merapi Mountain National Park (Taman Nasional 
Gunung Merapi – TNGM). Following the Zoning Policy implemented in the 
TNGM area, there is a zone that should have been protected from mining 
activities, namely the reconstruction and mitigation zone. However, in its 
implementation, the conservation  collaboration agreement of one of the 
areas in the zone, namely the Kali Putih Area, is instead used by some parties 
to engage in sand mining activities.  The principal-agent theory is, thus, 
employed in this study to examine the extent of the relationship of every 
party in the zoning policy implementation process of an area designated as 
a Reconstruction and Mitigation Zone. The qualitative approach is used to 
gain direct insights pertaining to the implementation of efforts conducted 
by several relevant parties in conserving the Kali Putih Area in TNGM’s 
Reconstruction and Mitigation Zone. Study results ultimately show that 
moral hazard in the principal-agent theory should not only be understood 
as deviant behaviors enacted by the agent, but the moral hazard performed 
by the agent may also inϐluence the principal’s  decision making process. 
This research is expected to provide an outlook to the government, which 
functions as the principal in a policy, to make several considerations prior 
to entering into any collaborative agreement or making any decision, so 
that the implementation process of policies can align with what has been 
previously planned.
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Introduction
The complexity of issues confronted by the government is no 
longer manageable by the government alone, as it ultimately requires 
collaboration with various existing components to satisfy public affairs 
by eliminating sectoral and organizational restrictions (Getha-Taylor, 
2007). In the case of public policy, for instance, the government as the 
decision maker often involves various non-governmental parties to deal 
with public policy implementation and formulation processes (Bergman 
& Lane, 1990; Coats, 2002; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 
2014). The principal-agent approach is eventually employed in public 
policy studies to avoid any issues in both policy implementation and 
formulation processes involving various other parties or delegations 
(Braun & Guston, 2003).
The policy pertaining to the conservation of the Merapi Mountain 
National Park (Taman Nasional Gunung Merapi – TNGM) area is one 
of the examples of a policy that continually involves various parties 
throughout both its implementation and formulation processes (Daru 
& Hudayana, 2015) The abundance of sand material in the TNGM area 
presents potential interests from various parties, hence requiring due 
considerations and thorough attention by the government in making a 
policy regulating the area’s conservation in order to avoid any potential 
conϐlict and illegal mining (Santoso & Wibawa, 2015; Daru & Hudayana, 
2015). The Decree of the Director General of Natural Resources and 
Ecosystem Conservation (Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam dan Ekosistem 
– KSDAE) number SK.37/KSDAE/SET/KSDAE.0/2/2016 was eventually 
made through a deliberative process in its formulation stage in order 
to accommodate the needs of all relevant stakeholders. The Decree 
introduced the zoning system in the TNGM area, which is distributed 
into six zones, with one of the zones being the focus of this study, namely 
the reconstruction and mitigation zone. In accordance with the Decree 
of the Director General of KSDAE of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry (Kementerian Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan – KLHK), the 
Reconstruction and Mitigation Zone is considered as a protected area 
and that any mining activity is prohibited in the area. 
In the reconstruction and mitigation zone there is a block called 
Jurang Jero in the Kali Putih area which is a lahar pathway abundant 
in sand and rock materials from prior eruptions. The output of the 
deliberations when drafting the TNGM zoning policy agreed that all 
activities pertaining to extracting and dredging sand in the area are 
prohibited, the area should, therefore, be free of any mining activities. 
However, in its implementation, mining activities have in fact been 
occurring in the Kali Putih area. Since 2015, before the TNGM zoning 
policy, manual sand mining operations have been carried out by 1122 
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locals who consider themselves to be under the 
Green Merapi Community (Paguyuban Merapi 
Hijau – PMH) group. PMH’s mining activities have 
continued from 2015 up to 2018 without any legal 
regulation in place. Eventually, sand mining by 
PMH in the Kali Putih area remained allowed by 
the TNGM Ofϐice (Balai TNGM – BTNGM) due to 
considerations that the surrounding community 
relies on the sand material available in the area, 
and that the damages inϐlicted by their mining 
activities remain minimal as it merely utilizes 
manual tools (hoes, scoopers, shovels).
Based upon those considerations, BTNGM 
had subsequently made arrangements as a 
strategy to collaborate with PMH, so that the 
activities carried out by the community may still 
continue in the Kali Putih area. A real problem in 
the implementation of the TNGM zoning policy in 
the reconstruction and mitigation zone emerged 
on the 13th of September, 2017 when Surya 
Karya Setiabudi (SKS) Ltd. came into the area 
with a letter of notice informing BTNGM that the 
company will begin conducting mining activities 
in the Kali Putih area. The recommendation 
letter for the technical conservation of the Kali 
Putih ϐlow has been given to SKS Ltd. by the 
Serayu Opak River Basin Primary Ofϐice (Balai 
Besar Wilayah Sungai Serayu Opak – BBWSSO) 
as the representative of the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources (Kementerian Energi dan 
Sumber Daya Mineral – KESDM), and as a result, 
SKS Ltd. considered that they have the license 
to conduct mining activities in the Kali Putih 
area. While according to BTNGM, the study that 
BBWSSO has in relation to the recommendation 
given for conserving the Kali Putih area is not in 
line with their purview or capacity. Eventually, the 
presence of SKS Ltd. has in fact triggered various 
conϐlicts involving PMH and SKS Ltd. 
In response to the various problems in the 
implementation process of the TNGM Zoning 
Policy in the Reconstruction and Mitigation Zone, 
KLHK ϐinally issued a collaboration agreement for 
the conservation of the Kali Putih area with SKS 
Ltd. via a decree made by the Director General 
of KSDAE. The content of the collaboration 
agreement refers to the authority given to SKS Ltd. 
by the Director General of KSDAE to conserve the 
Kali Putih area, with the consideration of previous 
mining activities conducted by SKS Ltd. and the 
recommendation letter for conservation of the 
Kali Putih area given by BBWSSO. In April 2018, 
KLHK also issued a collaboration agreement with 
the Green Merapi Community (PMH) via the Head 
of BTNGM, which is actually made on account of 
the conϐlict that occurred between PMH and SKS 
Ltd. Ultimately, the zoning policy implementation 
process in the reconstruction and mitigation zone 
presents two parties, namely PMH and SKS Ltd., as 
the agents of the government (of which in this case 
are KLHK and KESDM) in conducting conservation 
measures in the Kali Putih area. 
This study intends to examine the extent of 
SKS Ltd. and PMH’s role as agents in implementing 
TNGM zoning policy in the reconstruction 
and mitigation area, particularly in terms of 
conserving the Kali Putih area. The collaboration 
agreements made by KLHK and KESDM show that 
these two ministries function as the principal in 
this study. The study will also examine the extent 
of the relations between all the parties involved 
in the implementation of the zoning policy in the 
reconstruction and mitigation zone, as well as 
observe how the activities carried out by each 
of the agent in the study aligned with the need 
to conserving the area. Accordingly, the use of 
the principal-agent theory is considered as most 
appropriate in this study to observe and analyze 
the extent of the relationships between all the 
parties and the interests that each of the agent 
has. The principal-agent theory is also believed 
to be feasible for ϐinding potential information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent, 
which may cause the duties carried out by the 
agent to become unaligned with the policy 
objectives (Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & 
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Nurrochmat, 2014), and accordingly this study 
also aims to examine whether possibility of 
information asymmetry is also present in the Kali 
Putih area conservation case. 
Literature Review
P r i n c i p a l - A g e n t  T h e o r y  i n  P o l i c y 
Implementation
Chatagny & Soguel (2007) explain that 
the principal-agent model was initially used 
in economic studies to measure the extent 
of requirement in distribution of tasks and 
proϐit given by one party (principal) to another 
(agent). The objective of this theory is to avoid 
information asymmetry since the agent has other 
purposes that may not be observable or known 
by the principal, and this may result in the agent 
performing tasks that are not in line with the 
needs of the principal (Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
& Green, 1995; Laffont & Martimort, 2002). 
In its development, the principal-agent model 
eventually becomes a theory that is frequently 
used in public policy studies, and it is utilized 
to examine the formulation or implementation 
process of a policy (Bergman & Lane, 1990; Coats, 
2002; Chatagny & Soguel, 2007; Lane, 2013; 
Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 
2014). The principal-agent theory in public 
policy studies is considered most appropriate to 
examine policy formulation and implementation 
processes involving a number of actors, be it from 
the government side or other parties (Lane, 2013).
Factually speaking, applying the principal-
agent theory in the public sector is indeed 
very likely since the public sector has various 
delegations in the process of decision-making 
and fulϐilling public needs (Coats, 2002; Braun 
& Guston, 2003). In general, the principal-agent 
model is used in the public sector to examine 
the relationship between the government and 
the administrator, or the relationship between 
levels of government/administrator (Chatagny 
& Soguel, 2007). The principal-agent model can 
also be applied in the chain of delegation which 
involves the relationship of various actors in policy 
implementation, starting from the community, the 
government, and even the private sector (Braun & 
Guston, 2003; Imbeau, 2003). In other words, the 
principal-agent model does not only examine the 
relationship between two actors, it can also involve 
various actors as either principals or agents 
(Imbeau, 2003; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & 
Nurrochmat, 2014). In the public policy sector at 
the regional level, the principal-agent model can 
also be used to examine the relationship between 
the regional community as the principal and the 
local government as the agent (Chatagny & Soguel, 
2007). Therefore, the principal-agent model in 
public policy may accordingly be employed to 
examine the relationship of various actors given 
that the issues pertain to public needs. 
Essentially, the principal-agent model 
used in public policy approach does not have any 
signiϐicant differences with economic studies, 
wherein the model is employed to examine 
the information asymmetry occurring among 
several actors (as principal and agent) in a policy 
(Lane, 2013). Information asymmetry occurs 
when the agent has better information than 
the principal does, or the agent has objectives 
that are unknown by the principal so that in the 
policy implementation the agent will pursue 
any means to achieve their objective without 
the principal having any knowledge or capacity 
over the matter (Gracia, Rodriguez-sánchez, & 
Fdez-Valdivia, 2015). Hence, according to Lane 
(2013), the principal should avoid the following 
two things to remove information asymmetry, 
namely moral hazard and adverse selection. In 
the policy sector, the government as the decision 
maker should identify potential moral hazards 
and avoid adverse selection of every delegation 
tasked (Lane, 2013; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, 
& Nurrochmat, 2014). 
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Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Moral hazard is deϐined as opportunistic 
behaviors conducted by one of the actors to achieve 
an individual/group objective that is not within 
the interest of a predetermined collaboration 
contract or policy (Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, 
& Nurrochmat, 2014). In the agency relationship, 
both parties (principal and agent) should struggle 
to maximize their utility under mutually beneϐicial 
principles. However, the fact that one of the 
parties has better information than the other will 
result in a potential moral hazard emerging from 
one of them (Lane, 2013). Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat (2014) also explain 
that opportunistic behaviors are conducted by 
agents to achieve their objectives by reducing 
existing risks and transactional expenses during 
the policy implementation process. Given that 
the agents have more information (asymmetry 
of information), they are able to determine other 
objectives not stipulated in the policy that may be 
advantageous to them, and as a result, the agents 
will pursue any means to achieve said objectives 
(Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 
2014). In reality, such opportunistic behaviors 
occur due to the lack of the principal’s capacity 
in controlling information and overseeing their 
agents, so the agents have the information, 
capacity, and experience to achieve interests 
beyond the policy determined by the principal 
instead (Lane, 2013; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, 
& Nurrochmat, 2014). Hence, it is important 
to understand the potential of opportunistic 
behaviors (moral hazards) from the various actors 
involved in the policy implementation process 
in order to avoid any other interests that are not 
included in the policy (Lane, 2013). 
Aside from moral hazard, the possibility 
of adverse selection is also another issue that 
should be avoided in the principal-agent model. 
Adverse selection is deϐined as the principal’s 
error in selecting the agent (Lane, 2013). The 
error occurs when the principal has no capacity 
to identify the agent’s expertise, or the principal 
fails to thoroughly verify the agent’s capacity 
prior to making any decision (Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 2014). The principal’s 
error in selecting the agent ultimately impacts 
the policy implementation process in achieving 
the preplanned objectives because the selected 
agents have no capacity or they have other 
agendas that disrupt the policy implementation 
process itself (Lane, 2013). Ultimately, the agent 
selection process conducted by the principal is the 
most important part in the policy implementation 
process because it will determine how the policy 
implementation process will operate in the future. 
Multiple Principal-Agent
The issue in implementing the principal-
agent model in public policy is the large amount 
of delegations in both the policy formulation and 
policy implementation processes, resulting in 
multiple actors playing the role as principal or 
agent (Imbeau, 2003). The presence of several 
principals and agents increases the potential 
for greater information asymmetry. This is on 
account of the fact that several principals are 
present with differing and unaligned objectives 
and interests, which leads to a decision making 
process that is at times not necessarily in 
accordance with the public’s needs, and provides 
opportunities for other considerably beneϐicial 
group interests instead (Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 2014). Accordingly, 
Zubayr et al. (2014) state that the concept of 
principal-agent can be used to analyze public 
policy commitment in both formulation and 
implementation processes.
The principal-agent model is considered 
feasible to explain the key issues in interactions 
between principals and agents within the policy 
formulation and implementation processes that 
relate to performance and service provision 
(Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 
2014). In addition to paying close attention 
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to the moral hazard and adverse selection 
aspects, Zubayr et al. (2014) also supplemented 
components of inter-principal relationship (P-P 
problems) and inter-agent relationship (A-A 
problems) within the principal-agent framework 
for public policy studies. Previous studies indicate 
that problems of inter-principal relationship 
may occur due to incompatible objectives that 
respective principals have (Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008). 
As an example from prior research is the case of 
forest area utilization policy implementation, 
where the delegation of authority lies in the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry and the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, and 
they sometimes disagree in selecting the agents 
that manage the forest areas (Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 2014). Different opinions 
among the principals in selecting agents may cause 
problems in both policy formulation and policy 
implementation processes because the selected 
agents will most likely represent the interests of 
one of the principals, which ultimately make it 
more difϐicult to achieve the main objective of the 
policy (Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008; Jiang & Peng, 2010).
The presence of more than one principal in 
the principal-agent model in public policy (known 
as multiple principal) must be identiϐied, particularly 
in terms of their interests and objectives, so that 
the appointment of tasks to the agents is in line 
with the policy requirement (Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 2014). Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat (2014) also elaborate 
that every principal should resolve any internal 
issues occurring among them and then collectively 
determine agent(s) that are appropriate with the 
predetermined policy requirement. Nonetheless, 
some cases indicate that the collective objective of 
multiple principals are usually difϐicult to accomplish 
due to the lack of coordination among the principals 
(Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, 
& Nurrochmat, 2014).
Zubayr Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat 
(2014) also emphasize that coordination should 
also be administered on the agents, if there are 
more than one agent tasked in a collaboration 
agreement or policy. Coordination among agents 
for the distribution of tasks and proϐit is considered 
substantial in order for the implementation 
process to be properly aligned with the main 
objective of the policy previously established by 
the principal(s) (Lane, 2013). Problems often 
occur as a result of one agent disagreeing with 
an activity carried out by another agent, although 
the activity has been approved by the principal 
(Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 
2014). Such problems may undoubtedly hamper 
the implementation process of a policy, and 
accordingly the role of each actor in the principal-
agent model used in public policy studies should 
be based on solid coordination.
As described in the previous passage, the 
implementation of the principal-agent model in 
public policy requires good coordination among 
the actors. Good coordination should not only be 
achieved in the relationship between the principal 
and the agent, but in inter-principal and inter-
agent relations as well. The implementation of 
the principal-agent model in policy studies should 
also anticipate the presence of moral hazards 
and adverse selection of groups with a stake in 
the policy (both principal and agent), so that the 
policy’s main objective can be optimally achieved 
without any particular group interest included 
in the program (Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & 
Nurrochmat, 2014).
Methods
The study employed the descriptive 
qualitative method in collecting data, and it 
presents a detailed and thorough description of 
an issue or context of a situation (Neuman, 2014). 
By using the qualitative method, a research is 
considered capable of carrying out in-depth and 
detailed exploration of behavioral phenomenon 
(Patton, 2002). To provide further detail, a 
case study approach was used to emphasize 
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the exploratory process of a limited system in 
one case or several cases (Creswell, 2007). The 
case study approached was used to investigate 
a social condition, situation, or certain event, so 
that it may provide greater insight describing 
the process of how such an event or situation 
unfolds (Yin, 2011). Case study is considered to be 
advantageous in showcasing essential things that 
are subject to the social process of the community 
in a concrete event, based on the experience of the 
stakeholders (Hodgetts & Stolte, 2012). 
Ultimately, this article aims to gain a 
deeper understanding of TNGM’s zoning policy 
implementation process, particularly in the case 
of conserving the reconstruction and mitigation 
zone in the Kali Putih area. This study will show 
how the delegations that are involved in the 
process of conserving the Kali Putih area carried 
out their duties according to the previously 
established mandate of the TNGM Zoning Policy 
(in accordance with the Decree of the Director 
General of KSDAE). The Reconstruction and 
Mitigation Zone in the Kali Putih Area was selected 
based on the presence of a number of delegations 
(namely SKS Ltd. and PMH) in the conservation 
process, as well as the sand material deposit in 
the area which caused potential conϐlicts to occur 
among all the relevant parties. 
There are six sources in the data collection, 
namely: documents, recordings, interviews, direct 
observation, archives, participant observation, 
and physical artifacts (Yin, 2011). In the study, 
the data collection stage consisted of conducting 
interviews with key informants who have direct 
experience and thorough knowledge of the 
TNGM zoning policy implementation issue in 
the reconstruction and mitigation zone of the 
Kali Putih Area, as well as gathering documents 
relevant to the study matter. The entire data were 
collected based on direct on-site observation and 
by using the participant observation approach. 
Participant observation is used in studies that 
involve the researcher directly throughout every 
process, requiring the researcher to experience 
the existing conditions on the ϐield, and be 
involved in the daily events of the study objects 
(Sugiyono, 2008). The researcher, as one of the 
parties involved in the TNGM Zoning policy 
implementation process, was ultimately able to 
obtain information from various other parties 
involved, as well as information about the daily 
issues occurring in the policy implementation 
process in TNGM’s reconstruction and mitigation 
zone in the Kali Putih Area. 
Results and Discussions
Principal-Agent Relation in the Reconstruction 
and Mitigation Zone
Based on the previous explanation, the 
application of the principal-agent model in 
policy implementation process can be observed 
through a chain of delegation involving several 
parties from varying circles (Braun & Guston, 
2003; Imbeau, 2003). In the case of TNGM zoning 
policy implementation in the reconstruction 
and mitigation zone, the chain of delegation 
can be observed as a letter of collaboration 
agreement was given by KLHK to SKS Ltd. and 
PMH. Both SKS Ltd. and PMH function as agents 
in implementing TNGM’s zoning policy to conduct 
conservation in the Kali Putih Area. What sets 
the two apart is that SKS Ltd. had come to play 
its role through a recommendation provided by 
BBWSSO as the government representative in 
charge of affairs relating to Energy and Mineral 
Resources (Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral – 
ESDM). Accordingly, in addition to having two 
agents in the implementation of TNGM zoning 
policy in the reconstruction and mitigation zone, 
there are also two principals involved, namely the 
government in the ESDM sector that provided SKS 
Ltd. the recommendation letter for conserving 
the Kali Putih Area, and the government in the 
Environment and Forestry (Lingkungan Hidup dan 
Kehutanan – LHK) sector that maintains authority 
in affairs relating to TNGM’s zoning system. 
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Figure 1. 
Principal-agent relation in the 
implementation of TNGM Zoning Policy
Source:  Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & 
Nurrochmat, 2014.
In line with the structure of the principal-
agent relation in the implementation of TNGM 
zoning policy above, SKS Ltd. (ASKS) plays the role 
of the agent given the authority to conserve the Kali 
Putih Area by BBWSSO as the principal in the ϐield 
of ESDM (PESDM), and KLHK as the principal in 
the ϐield of LHK (PLHK). Meanwhile, PMH (APMH) 
plays the role of the agent with responsibility 
given by PLHK to carry out strengthening 
function in the TNGM Area through community 
empowerment collaborations. Based on the 
previous explanation, policy implementation 
in the principal-agent model can be considered 
successful when there is good coordination 
among all the parties involved, and that there is no 
information asymmetry between principals and 
agents (Lane, 2013). Whereas in the TNGM zoning 
policy implementation case, there were various 
problems generated from the lack of coordination 
that constantly occurred, eventually resulting in 
conϐlict among all the parties.
Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurroc hmat 
(2014) state that policy implementation involving 
more than one principal will increase the potential 
for information asymmetry instead since each 
principal usually has its own respective objectives 
and interests. In reality, this is what happened in 
the TNGM zoning policy implementation case, 
wherein initially PESDM and PLHK have different 
objective and interest in the reconstruction 
and mitigation zone, particularly in the Kali 
Putih Area. The start of sand mining activities 
conducted by ASKS in the Kali Putih Area was 
prompted by PESDM’s recommendation letter to 
conduct such mining activities. While according 
to the deliberative policy that has been drafted 
and enacted by PLHK in prior, the Kali Putih 
Area is actually included in the reconstruction 
and mitigation zone, which is prohibited for 
conducting any mining activities.
According to the testimony of one of the 
informants, the recommendation was given by 
PESDM because ASKS had submitted a request to 
conduct mining activity in another area and it had 
been approved by PESDM with incentive given to 
a certain individual working in PESDM. ASKS also 
proposed for a new area replacement to PESDM 
so that they could carry out their mining activity. 
Subsequently, ASKS was selected for conducting 
mining activities in the Kali Putih Area and this is 
approved by PESDM, wherein a recommendation 
letter for the conservation of the Kali Putih Area 
was then given by PESDM to ASKS. 
Information asymmetry clearly occurred 
when ASKS unexpectedly submitted a letter of 
work commencement to PLHK and began their 
mining activities in the Kali Putih Area. PLHK 
had no prior knowledge of the recommendation 
given by PESDM to ASKS to carry out conservation 
of the Kali Putih Area in the reconstruction and 
mitigation zone. Poor coordination between the 
principals (PLHK and PESDM) in the zoning policy 
implementation case can also be observed from 
the different opinions that the two principals 
have relating to the urgency of the Kali Putih 
Area conservation by ASKS. As stated by Zubayr, 
Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat (2014), 
poor coordination among the principals (known 
as P-P problems) will instead provide other 
opportunities outside of the policy interest to 
intervene in the policy implementation process. In 
reality, the presence of ASKS in the implementation 
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of TNGM zoning policy is an example of external 
interests intervening in a predetermined policy 
requirement. ASKS appeared with interests of 
conducting mining activities in the Kali Putih Area, 
which should be prohibited if it had referred to the 
decision made in the previous policy deliberation.
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the 
Conservation of the Kali Putih Area
According to prior studies, the occurrence 
of information asymmetry in a principal-agent 
relationship directly correlates with potential 
incidence of moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Lane, 2013; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & 
Nurrochmat, 2014). Moral hazard is deϐined as 
opportunistic behaviors to achieve a group’s 
objective that is outside of the collaboration 
contract or policy interest, whereas adverse 
selection is error made by the principal in 
identifying the selected agent’s ability and 
capacity (Lane, 2013). As described in the previous 
passages, the advent of moral hazard in ASKS has 
been apparent since the start of the mining activity 
intervention in the reconstruction and mitigation 
zone in mid September of 2017, which according 
to TNGM zoning policy should be prohibited. The 
Kali Putih conservation recommendation given by 
PESDM to ASKS is considered by several parties as 
a means to facilitate the mining activities of ASKS 
in the area for the sake of gaining company proϐit. 
This assumption is reinforced with other 
opportunistic behaviors shown by ASKS once 
they have secured a collaboration agreement with 
PLHK, which is bringing in heavy machineries 
to the Kali Putih Area. According to Law No. 
18/2003 and Presidential Regulation No. 
70/2014, heavy machineries are prohibited from 
being brought into National Park Areas, and it is 
considered as a criminal act when such actions 
are committed. While in fact, ASKS has brought 
in heavy machineries into the Kali Putih Area 
which is a part of the Merapi Mountain National 
Park Area. The fact that Kali Putih is included in 
the reconstruction and mitigation zone, which 
according to the issued TNGM zoning policy 
should not be allowed for any mining activities, 
makes it even more unsettling.
Aside from bringing heavy machineries, 
another moral hazard that ASKS committed was 
prohibiting the surrounding community (APMH) 
to carry out sand extraction activities in the Kali 
Putih area. While in the collaboration agreement 
made between ASKS and PLHK, it is stipulated that 
ASKS must coordinate with APMH to determine 
the area distribution in the conservation of the 
Kali Putih Area. Yet in its implementation, ASKS 
did not allow APMH to engage in sand extraction 
activities in the Kali Putih Area instead. While 
factually speaking, prior to the collaboration 
agreement between PLHK and ASKS, APMH has 
been conducting sand extraction activities in the 
area since 2015. The lack of coordination between 
ASKS and APMH in their efforts of preserving 
the Kali Putih Area may be classiϐied as an A-A 
problem, which according to Zubayr, Darusman, 
Nugroho, & Nurrochmat (2014) is a problem that 
occurs in the policy implementation process and 
it includes coordination issues among the agents. 
In the collaboration agreement letter agreed 
upon by high ranking ofϐicials of PLHK and ASKS, it 
is stated that ASKS should engage in relationship 
with the community in the TNGM Area (which is 
also a part of APMH) in order to have a similar 
point of view regarding the arrangement of work 
areas. Additionally, high ranking ofϐicials of ASKS 
are also obligated to implement their agreement 
with APMH, which has been agreed upon by 
ofϐicials of ASKS and the chairperson of APMH in 
order to conserve the Kali Putih Area. Nonetheless, 
in its implementation, ASKS prohibited APMH to 
extract sand in some areas of Kali Putih. While in 
fact, the area claimed by ASKS used to be the area 
that was commonly used by APMH to conduct 
their sand extraction activities.
At the time, APMH had not entered into 
a collaboration agreement with PLHK, while 
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ASKS has secured a collaboration agreement and 
maintains authority over the management of these 
areas. However, one of the divisions of PLHK, 
namely the Ofϐice of TNGM, allowed the activities 
conducted by APMH since they are carried out 
through traditional means and do not destroy 
the TNGM Area. In fact, the activities conducted 
by APMH is believed by one of the informants as 
APMH’s efforts to participate in maintaining the 
preservation of TNGM and to provide assistance 
in the successful implementation of the previously 
agreed upon TNGM zoning policy.
Following the A-A problem between ASKS 
and APMH, the existing conϐlict between the two 
parties eventually became even more heated. 
ASKS was also considered to have violated 
the provisions previously stipulated in the 
collaboration agreement with PLHK. Ultimately, in 
order to dampen the inter-agent conϐlict, PLHK via 
one of its divisions (the Ofϐice of TNGM) entered 
into a collaboration agreement with APHM in the 
month of April 2017 so that it could take part in 
conserving the TNGM Area, particularly in the Kali 
Putih Area. This collaboration agreement indicates 
the support PLHK provides to APMH to contribute 
in managing the TNGM Area by empowering 
the surrounding community, monitoring area 
conservation, and tourism development. 
The research ϐindings have also proven 
that in reality the moral hazard perpetrated 
by the agent not only intervened in the policy 
implementation process (such as the mining 
activities carried out by ASKS), but it also 
inϐluenced the decision making process of the 
principal. According to the collected data it has 
been explained that the initial intervention ASKS 
committed was supported by PESDM through the 
recommendation letter. In line with the testimony 
of one of the informants, the decision made by 
PESDM to issue the recommendation letter was 
instigated by the incentive given by ASKS to one of 
the personnel at PESDM. Giving such incentive to 
a government employee is a form of moral hazard 
committed by ASKS to facilitate their interest in 
conducting mining activities in an area they desire. 
Actually, the moral hazard committed by the 
agent to inϐluence the principal’s decision making 
process did not only happen in the relationship 
between PESDM and ASKS, but it also happened 
in the case of the collaboration agreement 
settled between PLHK and ASKS. According to a 
testimony from one of the informants, the decision 
making process that PLHK undertook (to make a 
collaboration contract with ASKS) was marked 
with threats made by ASKS. ASKS threatened one 
of PLHK’s employee to immediately agree with 
the collaboration agreement made between the 
two parties. ASKS used the name of a political 
ϐigure as a way to intervene in the decision made 
by one of PLHK’s personnel. If the person were 
to disagree with the collaboration agreement 
for the conservation of the Kali Putih Area, ASKS 
threatened to report the PLHK ofϐicial to one of the 
political ϐigures so that he/she would be demoted 
from his/her position. Following the intervention, 
the collaboration agreement between ASKS and 
PLHK was eventually issued in the month of 
February of 2017. 
The acquired data ϐindings have reinforced 
a new hypothesis that moral hazard is not only 
able to intervene in the policy implementation 
process as observed in previous studies (Lane, 
2013; Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & Nurrochmat, 
2014), moral hazard committed by agents 
can also inϐluence the principal’s decision 
making process. The recommendation letter and 
collaboration letter made with PESDM and PLHK 
respectively were approved on account of the 
moral hazard committed by ASKS. Accordingly, 
in the principal-agent model applied to policy 
studies, the moral hazards that agents perpetrate 
should be anticipated in the principal’s decision 
making process. Once agents are able to include 
their interests in the principal’s decision making 
process (through interventions/moral hazards), 
then it will be easier for them to achieve certain 
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interests that are not included in the requirement 
of a policy implementation. 
This hypothesis can be proven by observing 
ASKS’ behavior once they have succeeded in 
intervening in PLHK and PESDM’s decision 
making process, wherein after the collaboration 
agreements had been settled, ASKS could commit 
other moral hazard potentials without reserve (such 
as using heavy machineries and prohibiting APMH’s 
activities). In addition to moral hazard, adverse 
selection was also an issue in the case of zoning 
policy implementation in the reconstruction and 
mitigation zone. Adverse selection in the principal-
agent model is deϐined as the principal’s error in 
selecting an agent (Lane, 2013). Such error may 
occur when the principal does not have the capacity 
to identify the expertise of the agent, or the principal 
fails to verify the agent’s entire capacity before 
making a decision (Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, & 
Nurrochmat, 2014). 
Adverse selection in the case of TNGM zoning 
policy implementation in the reconstruction and 
mitigation zone can be observed through the 
various problems that emerged once ASKS played 
its part as an agent. ASKS was adversely selected 
based on the collaboration agreement settled 
between ASKS and PLHK without any in-depth 
review of the capacity and capability that ASKS 
has. As previously explained, the collaboration 
agreement was the result of an intervention 
made by ASKS to one of PLHK’s ofϐicials. The 
ofϐicial was terriϐied as ASKS admitted to having 
close relationship with one of the political ϐigures 
in Indonesia, and ultimately the collaboration 
agreement was accepted by PLHK. While in fact, 
according to a testimony made by one of the 
informants, there was no reaction whatsoever 
from the political ϐigure whose name was used 
as a “tool” by ASKS even after the collaboration 
agreement between ASKS and PLHK was retracted.
As one of the informants admitted, in 
reality ASKS did not have solid relationship 
with one of the political ϐigures whose name 
was mentioned to the PLHK ofϐicial. Adverse 
selection is apparent in this case in which the 
PLHK ofϐicial lacked the capacity as a principal 
to thoroughly identify and verify the capacity of 
ASKS as an agent prior to making the decision of 
entering into a collaboration agreement for the 
conservation of the Kali Putih Area. And as a result, 
the collaboration agreement between PLHK and 
ASKS ultimately caused a rather complicated issue 
in the implementation of TNGM’s zoning policy 
in the reconstruction and mitigation area. If only 
from the start the PLHK ofϐicial had identiϐied 
and veriϐied the extent of ASKS’ relation with 
the political ϐigure, then the intervention ASKS 
committed in the Kali Putih Area could have been 
minimized. The PLHK’s ofϐicial’s lack of capacity 
is one of the examples that had led to an issue of 
adverse selection, which subsequently generated 
problems in the policy implementation process, 
particularly in this case is the implementation of 
TNGM zoning policy in the reconstruction and 
mitigation zone.
In addition, PLHK also continued to extend 
its collaboration agreement with ASKS even after 
the various problems that have been caused 
by ASKS, without any measures/sanctions 
imposed on the agent. When the collaboration 
agreement between PLHK and ASKS had expired 
in the month of April 2018, an extension letter 
of the collaboration agreement had been settled 
between the two sides. Another case of adverse 
selection is observed here, wherein the extension 
is instead accepted by PLHK, while at the same 
time ASKS had violated several provisions in 
the collaboration agreement. In terms of the 
collaboration agreement extension case, PLHK 
is considered incapable of thoroughly verifying 
the capacity and capability of ASKS as an agent. 
With all the violations that ASKS had committed, 
the collaboration agreement should not have 
been extended so that the Kali Putih Area in the 
reconstruction and mitigation zone can remain 
preserved and protected. 
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Table 1. 
Principal-Agent Model in the 
Implementation of TNGM Zoning Policy 




Initiation of mining activity operation 
by ASKS in the Kali Putih Area, which 
is a reconstruction and mitigation 
zone of TNGM. ASKS has an interest 
to conduct mining activities for 
company proϐit, while PLHK aims to 
conserve the TNGM area.
Moral Hazard 
(ASKS)
• Heavy machinery activities in the 
National Park Area
• Intervention to APMH’s sand 
extraction activities
• Providing incentive to obtain 
recommendation from PESDM
• Intervention by using the name 
of a political ϐigure to obtain 




• PLHK’s lack of knowledge/
understanding as to the extent of 
ASKS’ relation with the political 
ϐigure
• Extension of the collaboration 
agreement between PLHK and 
ASKS
P-P Problem We a k  c o o r d i n a t i o n  b e t w e e n 
PESDM and PLHK in relation to the 
maintenance and implementation of 
TNGM zoning policy
A-A Problem Lack of willingness from ASKS to 
engage in collaboration with APMH 
in order to maintain and manage the 
Kali Putih Area
Source:  Lane (2013); Zubayr, Darusman, Nugroho, 
& Nurrochmat (2014).
Conclusion
By using the principal-agent model, it is 
obvious that the implementation of TNGM zoning 
policy in the reconstruction and mitigation 
zone still faces several problems. The evident 
information asymmetry between PLHK and ASKS 
had undoubtedly inϐluenced the conservation of 
the Kali Putih Area, which should not be exploited 
as a site for mining activities in accordance with 
the TNGM zoning policy. PLHK’s weakness as 
a principal in anticipating moral hazards and 
adverse selection had direct impact on problems 
occurring in the reconstruction and mitigation 
zone. PLHK as the principal should conduct 
thorough identiϐication and veriϐication measures 
on ASKS as the agent prior to making any decisions 
in the collaboration agreement, without being 
inϐluenced by any threats posed by the agent.
 In addition, the study also found a 
new hypothesis, which is that moral hazards 
committed by an agent do not only disrupt 
the policy implementation process, but moral 
hazards can also inϐluence the principal’s decision 
making process. The hypothesis can be observed 
in the behavior of agents like ASKS that are able 
to intervene in the decision making process 
of every principal (PLHK and PESDM) in the 
implementation of TNGM zoning policy. Such 
moral hazards committed by an agent should, 
therefore, be anticipated not only to facilitate a 
smooth policy implementation process, but also 
to avoid principals from making decisions that are 
not aligned with the established policy objectives. 
The presence of multiple principals and multiple 
agents should also be strengthened through good 
coordination among all the parties involved. This 
is imperative in order to avoid any coordination 
problems, such as the P-P problem and A-A 
problem that unfolded in the implementation of 
TNGM zoning policy in the reconstruction and 
mitigation zone. Weak coordination between 
PLHK and PESDM, as well as between APMH 
and ASKS, had resulted in various problems or 
conϐlict potentials in the implementation process 
of TNGM zoning policy in the Kali Putih Area of 
the reconstruction and mitigation zone.
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